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Abstract
Next-generation communication networks will likely involve the energy-efficient transfer of information and
energy over the same wireless channel, for which the physical layer will become more vulnerable to cyber attacks
by potential multi-antenna eavesdroppers. To address this issue, this paper considers transmit time-switching (TS)
mode, in which energy and information signals are transmitted separately in time by the BS. This protocol is
not only easy to implement but also delivers the opportunity of multi-purpose beamforming, in which energy
beamformers during wireless power transfer are useful in jamming the eavesdropper. In the presence of imperfect
channel estimation and multi-antenna eavesdroppers, the energy and information beamformers and the transmit TS
ratio are jointly optimized to maximize the worst-case user secrecy rate subject to UEs harvested energy thresholds
and a BS transmit power budget. New robust path-following algorithms, which involve one simple convex quadratic
program at each iteration are proposed for computational solutions of this difficult optimization problem and also
the problem of secure energy efficiency maximization. The latter is further complex due to additional optimization
variables appearing in the denominator of the secrecy rate function. Numerical results confirm that the performance
of the proposed computational solutions is robust against the channel uncertainties.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Next-generation communication networks offers the potential to transfer information and energy through
the same wireless communication channel, where energy constrained users (UEs) would be able to not
only receive information but also harvest energy [1]–[3]. The information transfer generally aims at high
signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR) while the energy transfer aims at a high-power ambient
signal [4], [5]. In early developments, information and energy are excited to be transferred simultaneously
(at the same time) by the same signalling. To realize both wireless energy harvesting (EH) and information
decoding (ID), the user’s receivers need to split the received signal for EH and ID either by power splitting
(PS) or time switching (TS) [6], [7]. Our recent result in [8] shows that such protocol, particularly the PS
approach at the receiver, is not only complicated and inefficient for practical implementation, but also not
necessary. It is much more efficient to transfer information and energy separately and the users’s receivers
do not need any sophisticated device.
Wireless power transfer is more viable in sensor-networks or in dense small-cell deployment where
there is closer proximity between BS and UEs. Such densification of wireless network make the wireless
devices more vulnerable to malicious cyber attacks than ever [9], [10]. The eavesdropper can be more
powerful as equipped by multi-antenna and in favorable channel condition. The information intended
to users of less favorable channel condition can be vulnerably leaked. Physical layer security aims to
secure data transmissions in such networks [11]–[13]. Many recent works considered looking into the
beamforming design problem to maximize secrecy rate under the BS transmit power budget [14]–[17].
Beamforming requires the knowledge of downlink channels to the UEs, which can be obtained via channel
estimation. Due to channel estimation errors in practical systems, the BS cannot expect perfect channel
3knowledge, which demands for robust beamforming design in the presence of channel uncertainties [14],
[16]. Adding wireless energy harvesting (EH) feature due to its viability in dense small-cell deployment
introduces another EH constraint in secrecy rate optimization problem [18]. As mentioned above, physical
layer security becomes more relevant in wireless information and power transfer systems.
Robust beamforming design in the presence of channel uncertainties with the same objective of secrecy
rate maximization under receiver EH thresholds in addition to BS transmit power budget was recently
considered in [19]–[22]. Some of these works assume either only EH feature or only ID capability at the
UEs [20], [21], so there were no PS or TS based simultaneous wireless information and power transfer
(SWIPT) receivers. Assuming PS-based SWIPT receivers, secrecy rate maximization was studied in [19],
[22]. At griding points of normal rates, these works employ semi-definite programming and alternating
optimization, where rank-one constraints have to be dropped and computationally complex matrices have
to be optimized. Randomization has to be employed to achieve feasible beamforming vectors [22]. As
already pointed out by [23] while ago, such randomization approach is not quite efficient. Moreover, with
the existing PS approach, it is well known that it is not practically easy to implement variable range
power splitter and also, one can not jam the eavesdropper without transmitting artificial noise [8]. In
contrast, as shown in the present paper, our recently proposed transmit TS approach [8] does not require
to transmit extra artificial noise thanks to the fact that power-bearing signal sent during EH time can be
simultaneously used to jam the eavesdropper.
Meanwhile, energy efficiency (EE) in terms of bits per Joule per Hertz is also a very important figure-
of-merit in assessing the practicability of next communication networks and beyond (see e.g. [24]–[29]),
where the Dinkelbach-type algorithm [30] of fractional programming is the main tool for obtaining
computational solutions (see e.g. [31], [32] and references therein). In the presence of eavesdroppers,
secrecy energy efficiency (SEE) maximization has been studied recently in [33], [34]. However, the
approach to treat SEE in [33], [34] is based on costly beamformers, which completely cancel the multi-
user interference and wiretapped signal at the eavesdroppers. Moving step ahead, energy harvesting brings
4in conflicting requirements form the viewpoint of EE, as it requires a stronger transmit power. The problem
of energy efficiency maximization in SWIPT systems has been recently studied in [35]–[37]. However,
either the authors don’t consider simultaneous EH and ID capability [37] or assume PS based receiver
[35], [36]. To the best of our knowledge, computational solution for robust beamforming design to achieve
secrecy rate and SEE optimization, particularly assuming practical TS-based wireless EH systems, is still
an open problem. The SEE objective is not a ratio of concave and convex functions, for which the
Dinkelbach’s algorithm based approach is very inefficient.
The subject of this paper is a multicell network, where the UEs in each cell are divided into two groups
depending upon their distance from the serving BS. The one closer to the BS take the advantage of higher
received power to perform wireless EH in addition to ID while the far-away users only conduct ID. We
consider imperfect channel state information (CSI) case where the BSs have imperfect channel knowledge
about UEs and eavesdroppers. We implement transmit TS approach [8] where BS transmits information
and energy separately in different time portions and the energy beamformers can be exploited to jam the
eavesdroppers.1 In the presence of channel uncertainties, we formulate the worst-case based robust secrecy
rate optimization problem. We solve for joint optimization of information and energy beamforming vectors
with the transmit TS ratio, that could maximize the minimum secrecy rate among all users, while ensuring
EH constraints for near-by users and transmit power constraints at the BSs. The problem is very difficult
computationally due many challenging constraints, for which a path-following algorithm is developed for
its computational solution. The algorithm does not require rank-constrained optimization and converges
quite quickly in few iterations. Through extensive simulation, the achieved secrecy rate is shown to be
close to the normal rate that excludes the presence of eavesdroppers. Furthermore, our numerical results
confirm that performance of the proposed algorithm is close to that of the perfect channel knowledge
case. In addition, the proposed algorithm not only outperforms the existing algorithm that models power-
1Though we propose transmit TS approach to solve max-min rate and power minimization problems in [8], however, the extension of
those developed algorithms to solve robust secrecy rate and energy efficiency maximization problem in the presence of eavesdroppers and
channel estimation errors (as will be detailed shortly in this paper) is highly non-trivial.
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Fig. 1. Downlink multiuser multicell interference scenario in a dense network consisting of K small cells. For clarity, the intercell interference
channels are not shown, however, the interference occurs in all K cells.
splitting (PS) based receiver but also the proposed transmit TS based model is implementation-wise quite
simple than the PS-based model. In the end, we extend our development to solve and analyze robust SEE
maximization problem, which is further complex due to additional function of optimization variables in
the denominator of secrecy rate function.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the problem formulation for maximizing the worst-
case user secrecy rate and its challenges, whereas Section III develops its computational solution. Section
IV proposes a computational solution for the EE maximization. Section V evaluates the performance of
our proposed algorithms by numerical examples. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
Notation. We use <{·} operator to denote the real part of its argument, ∇ operator to denote the first-
order differential operator, and ‖x‖ and ‖X‖F to denote the Euclidean and Frobenius norm of a vector
x and matrix X, respectively. Also, we define 〈x,y〉 , xHy.
6II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a multicell network consisting of K small cells labeled by k ∈ K , {1, . . . , K}. As shown
in Fig. 1, in each cell k, a multi-antenna BS k with M antennas communicates with Nk single-antenna
users (UEs) (k, n), n ∈ Nk , {1, . . . , Nk} over the same bandwidth. We divide the users in each cell
k into two zones, such that there are N1,k users located nearby serving BS k in zone-1 and N2,k users
are located far from the BS k in zone-2, where Nk = N1,k + N2,k. By UE (k, n1) and UE (k, n2), we
mean UE n1 ∈ N1,k , {1, . . . , N1,k} in zone-1 and UE n2 ∈ N2,k , {N1,k + 1, . . . , Nk} in zone-2 of cell
k, respectively. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 1, we assume that for UEs (k, n) of cell k, there is a single
eavesdropper k with Nev antennas in zone-1, who eavesdrops upon the signals intended for UEs (k, n).
BSs intend to transfer energy to only their zone-1 users since they are located sufficiently near to their
serving BSs and are able to practically harvest energy. Information is transmitted to both zone-1 and zone-
2 users. Denote by xEk,n1 ∈ CM×1 and xIk,n ∈ CM×1 the EH beamforming vector and ID beamforming
vectors by BS k for its UE (k, n1) and UE (k, n), respectively. The channel h˜k¯,k,n ∈ CM×1 between BS k¯
and UE (k, n) is assumed to be frequency flat fading, which counts the effects of both large-scale pathloss
and small-scale fading. Denote sEk,n1 and s
I
k,n as the energy signal and information signal intended for UE
(k, n1) and UE (k, n) by BS k, with E{|sEk,n1|2} = E{|sIk,n|2} = 1. Let 0 < η < 1 be the time splitting
for transferring energy and information to UE. The baseband signal received by UE (k, n1) for EH is
yEk,n1 =
∑
k¯∈K
h˜Hk¯,k,n1
∑
n¯∈N1,k¯
xEk¯,n¯s
E
k¯,n¯ + z
a
k,n1
, (1)
where zak,n1 ∼ CN (0, σ2a) is the additive white complex Gaussian noise, with zero-mean and variance σ2a,
at the receiver of UE (k, n). Using (1) and assuming a linear EH model2, the harvested energy by the UE
(k, n1) can be written as
Ek,n1(x
E, η) , ζk,n1ηpk,n1(xE), (2)
2The recently studied non-linear EH model and waveform design for efficient wireless power transfer [38]–[40] is beyond the scope of
this work, but could be incorporated in future research.
7where
pk,n1(x
E) ,
∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k¯
|h˜Hk¯,k,n1xEk¯,n¯|2 + σ2a, (3)
and ζk,n1 ∈ (0, 1) is the energy conversion efficiency for the EH receiver. Here, we assume a common TS
ratio η for all BSs, k ∈ K, where near-by users harvest energy through wireless signals not only from the
serving BSs but also from the neighboring BSs. Note that the harvested and stored energy Ek,n1 may be
used later for different power constrained operations at UE (k, n1), e.g., assisting uplink data transmission
to the BS or performing downlink information processing. There and after xE , [xEk,n1 ]k∈K,n1∈N1,k . The
received signal by UE (k, n) for ID is
yIk,n = h˜
H
k,k,nx
I
k,ns
I
k,n + h˜
H
k,k,n
∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
xIk,n¯s
I
k,n¯ +
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
h˜Hk¯,k,n
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
xIk¯,n¯s
I
k¯,n¯ + z
a
k,n, (4)
where its first term represents the desired signal, while the second and third terms are the intracell
interference and intercell interference. The BSs are assumed to perform channel estimation to acquire
channel knowledge hk¯,k,n and the channel state information (CSI) errors are bounded by the uncertainty
k¯,k,n as follows [41], [42]:
ρ(h˜k¯,k,nh˜
H
k¯,k,n − hk¯,k,nhHk¯,k,n) ≤ k¯,k,n, (5)
where ρ(A) is called the spectral radius of matrix A: ρ(A) = maxi |λi(A)| with its eigenvalues λi(A),
and the channel uncertainties k¯,k,n are given by
k¯,k,n =

0‖hk¯,k,n‖2, k 6= k¯
1‖hk¯,k,n‖2, k = k¯,
(6)
where 0 and 1 are the normalized uncertainty levels related to neighboring cells’ UEs and the serving
cells’ UEs, respectively.3 Note that (5) covers all uncertainty structures [42]. Thus, incorporating the
channel uncertainties, the worst-case information rate decoded by UE (k, n) is given by [42]
(1− η) log2(1 + SINR-UEk,n) , (1− η) log2
(
1 +
|hHk,k,nxIk,n|2 − k,k,n‖xIk,n‖2
ϕk,n(xI)
)
(7)
3We have introduced two different uncertainty levels because later we will show in Section V that secrecy rate is more sensitive to the
estimation errors of serving users’ channels compared to that of the neighboring users’ channels.
8where xI , [xIk,n]k∈K,n∈Nk and
ϕk,n(x
I) ,
∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
|hHk,k,nxIk,n¯|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
intracell interference
+
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
|hHk¯,k,nxIk¯,n¯|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
intercell interference
+
∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
k,k,n‖xIk,n¯‖2 +
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
k¯,k,n‖xIk¯,n¯‖2 + σ2a. (8)
A multi-antenna eavesdropper with Nev antennas tries to eavesdrop the intended signals for the UE
(k, n). The signal received at the EV k is composed of the signal received during time fraction η, denoted
by yEk ∈ CNev×1 and given by
yEk =
∑
k¯∈K
H˜Hk¯,k
∑
n¯∈N1,k¯
xEk¯,n¯s
E
k¯,n¯ + z
a
k ,
and the signal received at the EV k during time fraction 1− η, denoted by yIk ∈ CNev×1 given by
yIk =
∑
k¯∈K
H˜Hk¯,k
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
xIk¯,n¯s
I
k¯,n¯ + z
a
k ,
where H˜k¯,k is the wiretap channel matrix of size M×Nev between BS k¯ and UE k and zak ∈ CNev (0, σ2aINev)
is noise [10], [43]–[45]. Since the eavesdropper is not aware of the time switching factor η, yEk is considered
as an additional noise to jam the eavesdropper. Therefore, the noise power at EV k in decoding sIk,n is
given by
η
∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k¯
‖H˜Hk¯,kxEk¯,n¯‖2 + (1− η)(
∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
‖H˜Hk¯,kxIk¯,n¯‖2 − ‖H˜
H
k,kx
I
k,n‖2) +Nevσ2a. (9)
We assume that the wiretap channel state informationHk¯,k is available through channel estimation subject
to some uncertainty [41], [42]
ρ(H˜k¯,kH˜
H
k¯,k −Hk¯,kHHk¯,k) ≤ k¯,k, ∀k¯, k ∈ K, (10)
where k¯,k = 0‖Hk¯,k‖2F and 0 is the normalized uncertainty level for the channels between BSs and the
eavesdroppers. Therefore, the worst received SINR at the EV k, corresponding to the signal targeted for
the UE (k, n), is given by [42]
SINR-EVk,n ,
‖HHk,kxIk,n‖2 + k,k‖xIk,n‖2
qk,n(x, η)
. (11)
9where
qk,n(x, η) ,
η
(1− η)
∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k
‖HHk¯,kxEk¯,n¯‖2−
∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k
k¯,k‖xEk¯,n¯‖2

+
∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
‖HHk,kxIk,n¯‖2 +
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
‖HHk¯,kxIk¯,n¯‖2
−
 ∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
k,k‖xIk,n¯‖2 +
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
k¯,k‖xIk¯,n¯‖2
+Nevσ2a/(1− η), (12)
where x ,
[
xE;xI
]
.
The main attractive feature in (11)-(12) is that the EH signals contribute very much to the denominator
of the SINR (11) at EV k, i.e. they are also used in jamming the EV k. The secrecy rate expression for
UE (k, n) in nat/sec/Hz is given as [46]
fk,n(x, η) = (1− η) ln(1 + SINR-UEk,n)− ln(1 + SINR-EVk,n)
= (1− η) ln
(
1 +
|hHk,k,nxIk,n|2 − k,k,n‖xIk,n‖2
ϕk,n(xI)
)
− ln
(
1 +
‖HHk,kxIk,n‖2 + k,k‖xIk,n‖2
qk,n(x, η)
)
,
= (1− η)f 1k,n(xI)− f 2k,n(x, η) (13)
where
f 1k,n(x
I) , ln
(
1 +
|hHk,k,nxIk,n|2 − k,k,n‖xIk,n‖2
ϕk,n(xI)
)
and
f 2k,n(x, η) , ln
(
1 +
‖HHk,kxIk,n‖2 + k,k‖xIk,n‖2
qk,n(x, η)
)
.
The corresponding rate can be calculated in bits/sec/Hz units by evaluating fk,n(x,η)
ln 2
.
At first, we aim to jointly optimize the transmit information and energy beamforming vectors, xEk,n1
and xIk,n, respectively, and the TS ratio η to maximize the minimum (user with worst channel conditions)
10
secrecy rate
max
xE
k,n1
,xI
k,n
∈CM×1
η∈(0,1)
F (x, η) , min
k∈K,n∈Nk
fk,n(x, η) = min
k∈K,n∈Nk
[
(1− η)f 1k,n(xI)− f 2k,n(x, η)
]
(14a)
s.t. gk(xk) , η
∑
n1∈N1,k
‖xEk,n1‖2 + (1− η)
∑
n∈Nk
‖xIk,n‖2 ≤ Pmaxk , ∀k ∈ K, (14b)
g(x) , η
∑
k∈K
∑
n1∈N1,k
‖xEk,n1‖2 + (1− η)
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈Nk
‖xIk,n‖2 ≤ Pmax, (14c)
pk,n1(x
E)− e
min
k,n1
ζk,n1η
≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K, n1 ∈ N1,k, (14d)
‖xEk,n1‖2 ≤ Pmaxk , ‖xIk,n‖2 ≤ Pmaxk , ∀k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk, (14e)
where xk , [xEk,n1 ;xIk,n]n1∈N1,k,n∈Nk,∈K.
Constraint (14b) is the individual cell transmit power budget, Pmaxk , at each BS k while constraint
(14c) is the total transmit power budget, Pmax, of the network. Constraint (14d) requires that UE (k, n1)
harvests energy is greater than some preset target threshold emink,n1 . Constraint (14e) is imposed to budget
the beamforming power separately for each UE (k, n) during both EH and ID times. Note that the
objective (14a) is highly non-concave while constraints (14b)-(14d) are non-convex due to coupling
between beamforming vectors x and time splitting factor η.
III. PROPOSED PATH-FOLLOWING COMPUTATION
In order to solve non-convex problem (14), we make the variable change:
1− η = 1
µ
, (15)
which implies the following linear constraint
µ > 1. (16)
In what follows, we first transform the original max-min secrecy rate problem (14) by using a new variable
µ.
11
Transformation of Problem (14) by using a new variable µ: Using (15), the power constraints (14b)
and (14c) become the following constraints:
g¯k(xk, µ) ,
∑
n1∈N1,k
‖xEk,n1‖2 +
1
µ
∑
n∈Nk
‖xIk,n‖2 −
1
µ
∑
n1∈N1,k
‖xEk,n1‖2 ≤ Pmaxk , ∀k ∈ K (17a)
g¯(x, µ) ,
∑
k∈K
∑
n1∈N1,k
‖xEk,n1‖2 +
1
µ
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈Nk
‖xIk,n‖2 −
1
µ
∑
k∈K
∑
n1∈N1,k
‖xEk,n1‖2 ≤ Pmax (17b)
and applying (15) in (14d), the EH constraint (14d) in variable µ will become:
pk,n1(x
E) ≥ e
min
k,n1
ζk,n1
(
1 +
1
µ− 1
)
− σ2a. (18)
Under the variable change (13), the achievable secrecy rate in new variable µ is given by
f¯k,n(x, µ) =
1
µ
f 1k,n(x
I)− f¯ 2k,n(x, µ) (19)
where
f¯ 2k,n(x, µ) , ln
(
1 +
‖HHk,kxIk,n‖2 + k,k‖xIk,n‖2
q¯k,n(x, µ)
)
(20)
and by using qk,n(x, η) in (12), q¯k,n(x, µ) is defined as follows:
q¯k,n(x, µ) , (µ− 1)
∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k
‖HHk¯,kxEk¯,n¯‖2−
∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k
k¯,k‖xEk¯,n¯‖2

+
∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
‖HHk,kxIk,n¯‖2 +
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
‖HHk¯,kxIk¯,n¯‖2
−
 ∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
k,k‖xIk,n¯‖2 +
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
k¯,k‖xIk¯,n¯‖2
+ µNevσ2a, (21)
Using (17), (18), and (26), the equivalence of problem (14) in variables x and µ is given by
max
xEk,n1
,xIk,n∈CM×1,µ
min
k∈K,n∈Nk
[
1
µ
f 1k,n(x
I)− f¯ 2k,n(x, µ)
]
(22a)
s.t. (14e), (16), (17), (18). (22b)
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Inner Approximation of Power constraint (17) and EH constraint (18):4 Let (x(`), µ(`)) be a feasible
point for (22). By exploiting the convexity of function 1
µ
‖x‖2, the following inequality holds true
‖x‖2
µ
≥ 2<
{
(x(`))Hx
}
µ(`)
− ‖x
(`)‖2
(µ(`))2
µ, ∀x ∈ CN ,x(`) ∈ CN , µ > 0, µ(`) > 0. (23)
Thus using (23), an inner convex approximation of non-convex constraints (17a) and (17b) is given by
g¯
(`)
k (xk, µ) ,
∑
n1∈N1,k
‖xEk,n1‖2 +
1
µ
∑
n∈Nk
‖xIk,n‖2
− 1
µ(`)
∑
n1∈N1,k
2<
{
(x
E,(`)
k,n1
)HxEk,n1
}
+
µ
(µ(`))2
∑
n1∈N1,k
‖xE,(`)k,n1 ‖2 ≤ Pmaxk , ∀k ∈ K, (24a)
g¯(`)(x, µ) ,
∑
k∈K
∑
n1∈N1,k
‖xEk,n1‖2 +
1
µ
∑
k∈K
∑
n∈Nk
‖xIk,n‖2
− 1
µ(`)
∑
k∈K
∑
n1∈N1,k
2<
{
(x
E,(`)
k,n1
)HxEk,n1
}
+
µ
(µ(`))2
∑
k∈K
∑
n1∈N1,k
‖xE,(`)k,n1 ‖2 ≤ Pmax. (24b)
Next, following the definition of pk,n1(x
E) in (3), and using the approximation
|hHk¯,k,nxk¯,n¯|2 ≥ −|hHk¯,k,nx(`)k¯,n¯|2 + 2<
{(
x
(`)
k¯,n¯
)H
hk¯,k,nh
H
k¯,k,nxk¯,n¯
}
, ∀xk¯,n¯,x(`)k¯,n¯ (25)
an inner approximation of nonconvex constraint (18) is given by
∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k¯
[
2<
{
hHk¯,k,n1x
E,(`)
k¯,n¯
hHk¯,k,n1x
E
k¯,n¯
}
−
∣∣∣hHk¯,k,n1xE,(`)k¯,n¯ ∣∣∣2] ≥ emink,n1ζk,n1
(
1 +
1
µ− 1
)
− σ2a. (26)
Using the convex approximations (24) and (26) for the constraints of problem (22), we obtain the
following inner approximation at `th iteration:
max
xEk,n1
,xIk,n∈CM×1,µ
min
k∈K,n∈Nk
[
1
µ
f 1k,n(x
I)− f¯ 2k,n(x, µ)
]
(27a)
s.t. (14e), (16), (24a), (24b), (26). (27b)
4a constraint is called an inner approximation of another constraint if and only if any feasible point of the former is also feasible for the
latter [47]
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As observed in [48], for x¯Ik,n = e
−.arg(hHk,k,nxIk,n)xIk,n, one has |hHk,k,nxIk,n| = hHk,k,nx¯Ik,n = <{hHk,k,nx¯Ik,n} ≥ 0
and |hHk′,k,n′xIk,n| = |hHk′,k,n′x¯Ik,n| for (k′, n′) 6= (k, n) and  ,
√−1. The problem (27) is thus equivalent
to the following optimization problem:
max
xEk,n1
,xIk,n∈CM×1,µ
F¯ (x, µ) , min
k∈K,n∈Nk
f¯k,n(x, µ) = min
k∈K,n∈Nk
[
f¯ 1k,n(x
I , µ)− f¯ 2k,n(x, µ)
]
(28a)
s.t. <{hHk,k,nxIk,n} ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk, (28b)
(14e), (24a), (24b), (26), (16), (28c)
where
f¯ 1k,n(x
I , µ) , 1
µ
ln
(
1 +
(<{hHk,k,nxIk,n})2 − k,k,n‖xIk,n‖2
ϕk,n(xI)
)
, (29)
Lower Approximation of the Objective (28a): For concave lower approximation of f¯k,n(x, µ), which
agrees with f¯k,n at
(
w(`), µ(`)
)
, we provide a lower bounding concave function for the first term f¯ 1k,n(x
I , µ)
and an upper bounding convex function for the second term f¯ 2k,n(x, µ). Recalling the definition (8) of
ϕk,n(x
I), we have the following result.
Theorem 1: A lower bounding concave function f¯ 1,(`)k,n (x
I , µ) of f¯ 1k,n(x
I , µ), which agrees with f¯ 1k,n at
(x
I,(`)
k,n , µ
(`)), is given by
f¯ 1k,n(x
I , µ) ≥ f¯ 1,(`)k,n (xI , µ) , a(`) − b(`)
ϕk,n(x
I)
νk,n(xIk,n)
− c(`)µ (30)
for
νk,n(x
I
k,n) ≤ ψk,n(xIk,n)− k,k,n‖xIk,n‖2, ∀k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk, (31a)
νk,n ≥ 0 , ψk,n ≥ 0 , ∀k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk, (31b)
where
a(`) = 2
ln(1 + d(`))
µ(`)
+
d(`)
µ(`)(d(`) + 1)
> 0,
b(`) =
(d(`))2
µ(`)(d(`) + 1)
> 0, c(`) =
ln(1 + d(`))
(µ(`))2
> 0,
d(`) = ((<{hHk,k,nxI,(`)k,n })2 − 0||xI,(`)k,n ||2)/ϕk,n(xI,(`))
(32)
and
ψk,n(x
I
k,n) , 2<{hHk,k,nxI,(`)k,n }<
{
hHk,k,nx
I
k,n
}− (<{hHk,k,nxI,(`)k,n })2 . (33)
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The upper bounding convex function f¯ 2,(`)k,n (x, µ) on f¯
2
k,n(x, µ), which agrees with f¯
2
k,n at (x
(`), µ(`), is
given by
f¯ 2k,n(x, µ) ≤ f¯ 2,(`)k,n (x, µ)
, f¯ 2k,n(w(`), µ(`)) +
(
1 +
‖HHk,kwI,(`)k,n ‖2 + k,k‖wI,(`)k,n ‖2
q¯k,n(w(`), µ(`))
)−1
×
(
‖HHk,kxIk,n‖2 + k,k‖xIk,n‖2√
βk,n
− ‖H
H
k,kw
I,(`)
k,n ‖2 + k,k‖wI,(`)k,n ‖2
q¯k,n(w(`), µ(`))
)
(34)
where
βk,n > 0, ∀ k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk (35)√
βk,n ≤ q¯k,n(x, µ), ∀ k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk, (36)
where constraint (36) is innerly approximated by the constraint:
1
2
 βk,n√
β
(`)
k,n(µ
(`) − 1)
+
√
β
(`)
k,n(µ
(`) − 1)
(µ− 1)2
 ≤ q¯(`)k,n(x, µ) (37)
and
2µ(`) − 1− µ > 0. (38)
for √
β
(`)
k,n = q¯k,n(x
(`), µ(`)) (39)
and
q¯
(`)
k,n(x, µ) , −
1
µ− 1
 ∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
k,k‖xIk,n¯‖2+
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
k¯,k‖xIk¯,n¯‖2
−∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k
k¯,k‖xEk¯,n¯‖2
+
∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k
<
{〈
HHk¯,kxE,(`)k¯,n¯ , 2HHk¯,kx
E,(`)
k¯,n¯
xEk¯,n¯ −HHk¯,kxE,(`)k¯,n¯
〉}
+
2
µ(`) − 1
 ∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
<
{〈
HHk,kxI,(`)k,n¯ ,HHk,kxIk,n¯
〉}
+
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
<
{〈
HHk¯,kxI,(`)k¯,n¯ ,HHk¯,kxIk¯,n¯
〉}
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Algorithm 1 Path-following Algorithm for Secrecy Rate Optimization (14)
1: Initialize ` := 0.
2: Find a feasible point
(
xE,(0),xI,(0), µ(0)
)
of (22).
3: repeat
4: Solve convex problem (41) to find
(
xE,(`+1),xI,(`+1), µ(`+1)
)
.
5: Set ` := `+ 1.
6: until the objective in (22) converges.
−
 ∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
‖HHk,kxI,(`)k,n¯ ‖2 +
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
‖HHk¯,kxI,(`)k¯,n¯ ‖2
 µ− 1
(µ(`) − 1)2
+
(
1 +
2
µ(`) − 1 −
µ− 1
(µ(`) − 1)2
)
Nevσ
2
a. (40)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Thus, by applying Theorem 1, we can use the following convex quadratic program (QP) to achieve
minorant maximization for the nonconvex problem (28) at feasible (xE,(`)k,n ,x
I,(`)
k,n , µ
(`)):
max
xEk,n1
,xIk,n∈CM×1,µ
min
k∈K,n∈Nk
[
f¯
1,(`)
k,n (x
I , µ)− f¯ 2,(`)k,n (x, µ)
]
(41a)
s.t. (14e), (24a), (24b), (26), (16), (28b), (31), (35), (37), (38). (41b)
Details of Proposed Algorithm 1 with its Initialization: The proposed computation for the max-min
secrecy rate problem (22) (and hence (14)) is summarized in Algorithm 1. Since the objective function
in (41) agrees with that in (22) at (x(`), µ(`)), which is also feasible for (41), it follows that
min
k∈K,n∈Nk
[
1
µ(`+1)
f¯ 1k,n(x
I,(`+1))− f¯ 2k,n(x(`+1), µ(`+1))
]
≥
min
k∈K,n∈Nk
[
f¯
1,(`)
k,n (x
I,(`+1), µ(`+1))− f¯ 2,(`)k,n (x(`+1), µ(`+1))
]
>
min
k∈K,n∈Nk
[
f¯
1,(`)
k,n (x
I,(`), µ(`))− f¯ 2,(`)k,n (x(`), µ(`))
]
=
min
k∈K,n∈Nk
[
1
µ(`)
f¯ 1k,n(x
I,(`))− f¯ 2k,n(x(`), µ(`))
]
,
(42)
i.e. (x(`+1), µ(`+1)) is a feasible point, which is better than (x(`), µ(`)) for (22), whenever (x(`+1), µ(`+1)) 6=
(x(`), µ(`)). On the other hand, if (x(`+1), µ(`+1)) = (x(`), µ(`)), i.e. (x(`), µ(`)) is the optimal solution of the
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convex optimization problem (41) then it must satisfy the first order necessary optimality condition for
(41), which obviously is also the first order necessary optimality condition for (22). We thus proved that
the sequence {(x(`), µ(`))} converges to a point satisfying the first order necessary optimality condition
for the nonconvex optimization problem (22).
A feasible point
(
xE,(0),xI,(0), µ(0)
)
for (22) (and hence (14)) for initializing Algorithm 1 is found as
as follows. We first fix µ(0) and solve the following convex problem:
max
xxk,n∈CM×1,x∈{I,E}
min
k∈K,n∈Nk
<{hHk,k,nxEk,n1}−√emink,n / (ζk,n (1− 1/µ(0))) (43a)
s.t. ‖xEk,n1‖2 ≤ Pmaxk , ‖xIk,n‖2 ≤ Pmaxk , ∀k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk, (43b)
<{hHk,k,nxIk,n} ≥√erminµ(0) − 1
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
σa(
hH
k¯,k,n
xI
k¯,n¯
)
k¯,n¯∈K,N\{k,n}
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
, k ∈ K, n ∈ N , (43c)
g¯k
(
xk, µ
(0)
) ≤ Pmaxk , ∀k ∈ K, (43d)
g¯
(
x, µ(0)
) ≤ Pmax, (43e)
where, for quick convergence, the constraint (43c) on the information rate of UE (k, n) is imposed. Note
that the constraint (18) is satisfied if the objective function (43a) is positive. The constraint (43c) is a
second-order cone constraint [49]. Using the optimal solution xE,(0)k,n of (43) as the initial point, we then
iteratively solve the following convex program:
max
xxk,n∈CM×1,x∈{I,E}
min
k∈K,n∈Nk
∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
[
2<
{
hHk¯,k,nx
E,(`)
k¯,n¯
hHk¯,k,nx
E
k¯,n¯
}
−
∣∣∣hHk¯,k,nxE,(`)k¯,n¯ ∣∣∣2]
−e
min
k,n
ζk,n
(
1 +
1
µ(0) − 1
)
− σ2a s.t. (43b), (43c), (43d), (43e). (44)
until a positive value of the objective function is achieved. If either problem (43) is found infeasible or
an positive value by solving (44) is not found, we use different value of µ(0) and repeat the above process
until a feasible point
(
xE,(0),xI,(0), µ(0)
)
is obtained.5
5Our simulation results in Sec. V show that the initialization problems (43) or (44) are feasible, and in almost all of the scenarios
considered, we achieve a positive optimal value of (44) in one single iteration and with the first tried value of µ(0) = 1.11.
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IV. ENERGY EFFICIENT SECURE BEAMFORMING
This section extends the proposed robust secrecy rate maximization algorithm to solve the secrecy energy
efficiency (SEE) maximization problem, which is formulated in the presence of channel estimation errors
and eavesdroppers as
max
xE
k,n1
,xI
k,n
∈CM×1
η∈(0,1)
min
k∈K
∑
n∈Nk
[(1− η)f 1k,n(xI)− f 2k,n(x, η)]
1
ξ
gk(xk, η) +MPA + Pc
s.t. (14b), (14c), (14d), (14e) (45a)
(1− η)f 1k,n(xI)− f 2k,n(x, η) ≥ rk,n, ∀ k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk, (45b)
where ξ is the constant power amplifier efficiency, PA is the power dissipation at each transmit antenna,
Pc is the fixed circuit power consumption for base-band processing and rk,n is the threshold secrecy rate
to ensure quality of service. The security and energy efficiency are combined into a single objective in
(45a) to express the so-called secrecy EE (SEE) in terms of secrecy bits per Joule per Hertz.
The conventional approach to address (45) (see e.g. [31], [32]) is based on the Dinkelbach’s method
of fractional programming [30] to find τ > 0 such that the optimal value of the following optimization
problem is zero
max
xE
k,n1
,xI
k,n
∈CM×1
η∈(0,1)
min
k∈K
{∑
n∈Nk
[(1− η)f 1k,n(xI)− f 2k,n(x, η)]− τ [
1
ξ
gk(xk, η) +MPA + Pc]
}
s.t. (14b), (14c), (14d), (14e), (45b). (46)
However, for each fixed τ > 0, the optimization problem (46) is highly nonconvex convex and thus is still
difficult computationally. It is important to realize that the original Dinkelbach’s method [30] is attractive
only for maximizing a ratio of a convex and concave functions over a convex set, under which each
subproblem for fixed τ is an easy convex optimization problem. It is hardly useful whenever either the
objective is not ratio of a concave and convex function or the constrained set is not convex.
We now develop an efficient path-following computational procedure for solution of (45), which
bypasses such difficult optimization problem (46). Using the variable change (16) again, this problem
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is equivalent to
max
xE
k,n1
,xI
k,n
∈CM×1
µ>1,tk>0
min
k∈K
∑
n∈Nk
[
f 1k,n(x
I)
µ
√
tk
− f¯
2
k,n(x, µ)√
tk
] s.t. (14e), (17), (18), (16), (47a)
f¯ 1k,n(x
I , µ)− f¯ 2k,n(x, µ) ≥ rk,n ∀ k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk, (47b)
1
ξ
g¯k(xk, µ) +MPA + Pc ≤
√
tk,∀ k ∈ K, (47c)
By using (30) we obtain
f 1k,n(x
I)
µ
√
tk
≥ A(`) −B(`) ϕk,n(x
I)
νk,n(xIk,n)
− C(`)µ√tk
≥ Φ(`)k,n(x, µ, tk)
, A(`) −B(`) ϕk,n(x
I)
νk,n(xIk,n)
− C(`)

√
t
(`)
k
2µ(`)
µ2 +
µ(`)
2
√
t
(`)
k
tk
 (48)
for (31), where
√
t
(`)
k = g¯k(x
(`)
k , µ
(`)) +MPA + Pc and
A(`) = 2
ln(1 +D(`))
µ(`)
√
t
(`)
k
+
D(`)
µ(`)
√
t
(`)
k (D
(`) + 1)
> 0,
B(`) =
(D(`))2
µ(`)
√
t
(`)
k (D
(`) + 1)
> 0,
C(`) =
ln(1 +D(`))
[µ(`)
√
t
(`)
k ]
2
> 0,
D(`) = ((<{hHk,k,nxI,(`)k,n })2 − 0||xI,(`)k,n ||2)/ϕk,n(xI,(`)).
Similarly to (34), we have
f¯ 2k,n(x, µ)√
tk
≤ f¯
2
k,n(w
(`), µ(`))√
tk
+
(
1 +
‖HHk,kwI,(`)k,n ‖2 + k,k‖wI,(`)k,n ‖2
q¯k,n(w(`), µ(`))
)−1
×
(
‖HHk,kxIk,n‖2 + k,k‖xIk,n‖2√
tkβk,n
− ‖H
H
k,kw
I,(`)
k,n ‖2 + k,k‖wI,(`)k,n ‖2
q¯k,n(w(`), µ(`))
√
tk
)
(49)
≤ Ψ(`)k,n(x, µ, tk), (50)
with (35), (36) and
0 < tk ≤ 3t(`)k , ∀ k ∈ K, (51)
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Algorithm 2 Path-following Algorithm for SEE Optimization (45)
1: Initialize ` := 0.
2: Find a feasible point
(
xE,(0),xI,(0), t(0), µ(0)
)
of (47).
3: repeat
4: Solve convex program (53) for
(
xE,(`+1),xI,(`+1), t(`+1)µ(`+1)
)
.
5: Set ` := `+ 1.
6: until the objective in (47) converges.
where
Ψ
(`)
k,n(x, µ, tk) ,
f¯ 2k,n(w
(`), µ(`))√
tk
+
(
1 +
‖HHk,kwI,(`)k,n ‖2 + k,k‖wI,(`)k,n ‖2
q¯k,n(w(`), µ(`))
)−1
×
‖HHk,kxIk,n‖2 + k,k‖xIk,n‖2√
tkβk,n
− ‖H
H
k,kw
I,(`)
k,n ‖2 + k,k‖wI,(`)k,n ‖2
2q¯k,n(w(`), µ(`))
√
t
(`)
k
(
3− tk
t
(`)
k
) (52)
For the approximation (50) under (51), we have used the following inequality
1√
t
≥ 1
2
√
t¯
(
3− t
t¯
)
∀ t > 0, t¯ > 0.
The inner approximations in (48) and (50) can be easily followed by using the procedure in Appendix A.
The following convex program is minorant maximization for the nonconvex program (47)
max
xE
k,n1
,xI
k,n
∈CM×1
µ>1,tk>0
min
k∈K
∑
n∈Nk
[Φ
(`)
k,n(x, µ, tk))−Ψ(`)k,n(x, µ, tk)] (53a)
s.t. (14e), (24a), (24b), (26), (16), (28b), (31), (35), (51), (37), (38), (53b)
f¯
1,(`)
k,n (x
I , µ)− f¯ 2,(`)k,n (x, µ) ≥ rk,n ∀ k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk, (53c)
1
ξ
g¯
(`)
k (xk, µ) +MPA + Pc ≤
√
tk,∀ k ∈ K. (53d)
Algorithm 2 outlines the steps to solve max-min energy efficiency problem (47) (and hence (45)). Similar
to Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 generates a sequence
{(
xE,(`),xI,(`), t(`), µ(`)
)}
of improved points of (53),
which converges to a KKT point, where t(`) , [t(`)1 , . . . , t
(`)
K ]
T . A feasible point
(
xE,(0),xI,(0), t(0), µ(0)
)
of
(27) (and hence (45)) for initializing Algorithm 2 can be obtained by first solving (43) and (44) followed
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Fig. 2. A multicell network setup used in our numerical examples
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Fig. 3. Convergence of Algorithm 1 for M = 5 and emin = −20
dBm.
by a feasibility problem (53b), (53c), and (53d). It was already reported in Section III that how efficiently
the solution of (43) and (44) is obtained. The solution to the feasibility problem (53b), (53c), and (53d)
is mostly obtained at the first iteration.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
To analyze the proposed algorithms through simulations, a network topology as shown in Fig. 2 is set
up. There are K = 3 cells and N = Nk = 4, ∀ k ∈ K UEs per cell with two placed inside the inner-circle
in zone-1 and the remaining two placed in the outer zone near cell-edges, i.e., N1,k = N2,k = 2, ∀ k.
The cell radius is set to be 40m with inner circle radius of 15m. A single Nev = 2-antennas eavesdropper
is randomly placed inside the inner circle in each cell. The path loss exponent is set to be µ = 3. We
generate Rician fading channels with Rician factor, KR = 10 dB [3]. For simplicity, set emink,n1 ≡ emin for
the energy harvesting thresholds and ζk,n1 ≡ ζ , ∀k, n1 for the energy harvesting conversion. Further, we
set energy conversion efficiency ζ = 0.5, noise variance σ2a = −90 dBm (unless specified otherwise),
maximum BS transmit power Pmaxk = 26 dBm, ∀ k, which is in line with the frequently made assumption
for the power budget of small-cell BSs [50]. We choose the value Pmax = 30 dBm of the power budget for
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the whole network. Unless stated otherwise, we choose the uncertainty in eavesdroppers’ and neighboring
users’ channels, 0 = 0.005 and we choose the uncertainty in serving users’ channels 1 = 10−3. It is
justified to assume that BSs can achieve good channel estimates for their serving cell users compared to the
neighboring cell users in a dense small cell network. Later in this section, we also investigate the effect of
different values of channel uncertainties on the achievable secrecy rate. For energy efficiency maximization
problem in Section IV, we choose power amplifier efficiency ξ = 0.2, is the power dissipation at each
transmit antenna PA = 0.6W (27.78 dBm), and circuit power consumption Pc = 2.5W (33.97 dBm) [37],
[51]. We set the threshold secrecy rate rk,n = 0.1 bits/sec/Hz for M = 4 antennas at the BS and otherwise
rk,n = 0.5 bits/sec/Hz for M ∈ {5, 6} antenna-BSs.
The convergence of Algorithm 1 for M = 5 antenna BS and minimum energy harvesting threshold
emin = −20 dBm is shown by Fig. 3. We can see that for some fixed channel, whether we assume perfect
channel estimation 0 = 0, 1 = 0 or assume some channel uncertainty 0 = 0.005, 0 = 10−3, Algorithm
1 converges within 20 − 25 iterations. We also observe that if we assume the absence of eavesdropper,
Algorithm 1 quickly converges in about 4 iterations. On average, Algorithm 1 requires 22.5 iterations
before convergence, while the absence of eavesdroppers drops down the average required number of
iterations to 3.5. The slower convergence in the presence of eavesdroppers is expected since then, not
only the objective (41a) gets quite complicated, but also new constraints, (35), (37), and (38) are required
to be satisfied.
The worst secrecy and normal rates (in the absence of eavesdroppers) for both perfect channel estimation
0 = 0, 1 = 0 and with the presence of channel uncertainty of 0 = 0.005, 1 ∈ 10−3 are provided by Figs.
4 and 5. Basically, the secrecy rate by Algorithm 1 is compared with the normal rate. The latter excludes
eavesdroppers and accordingly the optimization problem (14) with f 2k,n(x, η) ≡ 0 in (14a) is solved. The
dashed curves in Figs. 4 and 5 have been plotted to refer to the presence of channel uncertainties, while
solid line curves refer to the absence of channel uncertainty 0 = 0, 1 = 0. We can observe from Figs. 4
and 5 that the proposed robust secrecy rate algorithm in the presence of channel uncertainties perform quite
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well and close to the case that assumes perfect channel estimation. However, the performance gap increases
by increasing the number of antennas as can be seen from Fig. 4. It is expected because increasing the
number of antennas, say from M = 4 to M = 5 increases the channel uncertainty in additional KN = 12
channel co-efficients. Moreover, we observe that the optimized rate by the proposed Algorithm 1 is quite
close to that achieved by the modified algorithm, which assumes absence of eavesdroppers in Algorithm
1. Fig. 4 plots the rate for different number of BS antennas M ∈ {4, 5, 6} with fixed EH threshold
emin = −20 dBm, while Fig. 5 plots the rate for varying values of EH targets emin ∈ {−25,−20, . . . , 0}
dBm with fixed number of antennas at the BS M = 5. In Fig. 4, we observe almost linear increase in
the achievable rate with increase in the number of BS antennas. In Fig. 5, we observe decrease in the
achievable rate with the increase in the EH targets. This is because higher EH targets demands for more
power from the BS to perform energy harvesting, which results in the decrease in the available power for
information decoding, thus decreases the achievable information rate. Overall, Figs. 4 and 5 indicate the
robustness of our proposed Algorithm 1.
Fig. 6 plots the worst secrecy and normal rates (in the absence of eavesdroppers) versus different levels of
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Fig. 6. Robust secrecy rate (with eavesdroppers) and normal rate
(without eavesdroppers) versus different levels of channel uncer-
tainty 0 for fixed energy harvesting threshold emin = −20 dBm
and BS antennas M = 5.
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Fig. 7. Robust secrecy rate (with eavesdroppers) and normal rate
(without eavesdroppers) versus different levels of channel uncer-
tainty 1 for fixed energy harvesting threshold emin = −20 dBm
and BS antennas M = 5.
channel uncertainty in neighboring users’ channels and the eavesdroppers’ channels 0 = {10−5, . . . , 10−2}
for fixed 1 = 10−3, while Fig. 7 plots such rates versus different levels of channel uncertainty in serving BS
users’ channels 0 = {10−5, . . . , 10−2} for fixed 0 = 0.005. We set energy harvesting threshold emin = −20
dBm and number of BS antennas M = 5. We can observe from Figs. 6 and 7 that the optimized rate
is almost un-affected for low channel uncertainties {10−5, . . . , 10−3}, and is slightly reduced if channel
uncertainty is increased to the level of 10−2. This advocates the robustness of Algorithm 1. Even for wide
range of values of channel uncertainty 0, the optimized secrecy rate by Algorithm 1 is quite close to that
achieved by the modified algorithm, which assumes absence of eavesdroppers in Algorithm 1.
Fig. 8 compares the secrecy rate performance of the proposed transmit TS-based system with that of
the power splitting (PS)-based system [18] under the perfect channel state information (0 = 0, 1 = 0).
For the PS-based receiver in [18], we set the ID circuit noise variance σ2c to be −90 dBm and the antenna
noise variance σ2a = −90 dBm. Thus, for fair comparison in Fig. 8, we add σ2c to σ2a, i.e., σ2a = −87 dBm,
for plotting the result for our proposed TS-based Algorithm 1. Fig. 8 plots the worst secrecy rate versus
number of antennas M for fixed energy harvesting threshold emin = −20 dBm. We can clearly observe
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TABLE I
COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED TS-BASED ALG. 1 AND PS-BASED ALGORITHM IN [18] FOR GENERAL M , N , K , AND
SPECIFIC M = 4, N = 4, K = 3 CASES.
Algorithms avg. # iter scalar variables linear constraints quadratic constraints
Algorithm 1 22.5 MK(N +N1) + 1 = 73 3KN +KN1 + (K + 1) = 46 4KN + 2KN1 + 1 = 61
PS Algorithm [18] 16 MK(N + 1) +KN1 = 66 K + 1 = 4 KN + 3KN1 = 30
a gain of around 0.5 bits/sec/Hz in the achieved secrecy rate of Algorithm 1 compared to that of the
algorithm in [18]. Note that the proposed TS-based system not only enjoys the performance gain, but also
promises implementation simplicity. The average number of iterations required for convergence are almost
same for both Algorithm 1 and the algorithm in [18]. However, the proposed TS-based system model
has a two-fold advantage; it not only enjoys the performance gain, but also promises implementation
simplicity, as motivated in the Introduction in Section I.
The computational complexity of the proposed Algorithm 1 is O (iA1(MK(N +N1) + 1)3 (7KN
+(K + 2) + 3KN1)) [52]. Here, iA1 = 22.5 is the average number of times that (41) is solved by
Algorithm 1. Table I shows the average number of iterations, scalar variables, and linear and quadratic
constraints required to solve per iteration by the proposed Algorithm 1 and the PS-based algorithm in
[18]. We can observe that though the PS-based algorithm in [18] requires the solution of fewer quadratic
and linear constraints, it is not practically easy to implement a variable range power splitter. Thus, the
proposed TS-based Algorithm 1 provides a practical solution to secure and robust beamforming.
Finally, the performance of our proposed SEE Algorithm 2 is evaluated. Fig. 9 shows the convergence
of proposed Algorithm 2 for M = 5 antennas at the BS and energy harvesting threshold emin = −20
dBm. We can see that for some fixed channel, whether we assume perfect channel estimation 0 = 0,
1 = 0 or assume some channel uncertainty 0 = 0.005, 0 = 10−3, Algorithm 2 converges within 20− 25
iterations. On average, Algorithm 2 requires approximately 18.5 iterations for convergence.
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Figs. 10 and 11 plot the secrecy energy efficiency and normal energy efficiency (in the absence of
eavesdroppers) for both perfect channel estimation 0 = 0, 1 = 0 and with the presence of channel
uncertainty of 0 = 0.005, 1 = 10−3. Here, the achievable SEE for Algorithm 2 is compared with the
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normal EE assuming no eavesdroppers, that is obtained by solving the optimization problem (45) with
f 2k,n(x, η) ≡ 0. The dashed curves in Figs. 10 and 11 refer to the presence of channel uncertainties
0 = 0.005, 1 = 10−3, while solid line curves refer to the absence of channel uncertainty 0 = 1 = 0. We
can observe from Figs. 10 and 11 that the optimized EE by the proposed Algorithm 2 is quite close to that
achieved by the modified algorithm, which assumes absence of eavesdroppers in Algorithm 2. Finally,
we observe from Fig. 10 that for perfect channel estimation, the optimized EE increases by increasing
the number of antennas, as per expectation, however, in the presence of channel uncertainties, the EE
decreases with the increase in the number of antennas. In order to investigate this, we have figured out
the numerator and denominator of EE function separately in the next two figures.
In Figs. 12 and 13, we plot the numerator and denominator of the EE function, (45a), respectively,
where numerator of EE corresponds to the sum-rate of the worst cell and denominator of EE corresponds
to the total power, 1
ξ
gk(xk, η) +MPA+Pc, of the worst cell’s BS. First, we can obersve from Fig. 13 that
denominator of EE function increases with the increase in the number of antennas. This This is because
increase in the number of antennas increases the non-transmission power MPA in the denominator of
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EE function, (45a). Next, we can observe from Fig. 12 that though the numerator part of EE function
also increases with the increase in the number of antennas, however, the numerator part increases swiftly
for the prefect channel estimation case (solid lines) when compared to its slow increase in the presence
of channel uncertainties (dashed lines). This results in slight decrease in the EE with the increase in the
number of antennas in the presence of erroneous estimates, as shown in Fig. 10.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Considering simple and efficient transmit TS approach to ensure wireless energy harvesting and in-
formation decoding in a dense multi-cell network, we have proposed robust secrecy rate and secrecy
energy efficiency maximization algorithms in the presence of multi-antenna eavesdroppers and channel
estimation errors. Our robust optimization algorithm jointly designs for transmit energy and information
beamformers at the BSs and the transmit TS ratio with the objective of maximizing the worst-case user
secrecy rate under BS transmit power and UE minimum harvested energy constraints. The problem is
very challenging due to nonconvex objective and numerous non-convex constraints. We have solved it
by a new robust path-following algorithm, which involves one simple convex quadratic program in each
iteration. We have also extended our algorithm to solve for worst cell secrecy EE maximization problem
under secrecy rate quality-of-service constraints, which is further complex due to additional function of
optimization variables in the denominator of secrecy rate function. Our numerical results confirm the
merits of the proposed algorithms as their performance is quite close to that of the case where there
are no eavesdroppers. Moreover, the proposed algorithm not only outperforms the existing algorithm
that models PS based receiver but also the proposed transmit TS based model is implementation-wise
quite simple than the PS-based model. Finally, we would like to hint towards an open future research
direction from this work, in which the proposed algorithms could be modified to accommodate only
channel distribution knowledge about the eavesdroppers. The rate-energy trade-off between transmit-TS
and receive-PS approaches could also be considered in future research.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We first prove (30) by using the following inequality for all x > 0, x¯ > 0, t > 0 and t¯ > 0
ln(1 + 1/x)
t
≥ f(x¯, t¯) + 〈∇f(x¯, t¯), (x, t)− (x¯, t¯)〉
= 2
ln(1 + 1/x¯)
t¯
+
1
t¯(x¯+ 1)
− x
(x¯+ 1)x¯t¯
− ln(1 + 1/x¯)
t¯2
t. (A.1)
which follows from the convexity of function ln(1+1/x)
t
.
By subsituting 1/x→ x and 1/x¯→ x¯ in (A.1), we have:
ln(1 + x)
t
≥ a− b
x
− ct, (A.2)
where a = 2 ln(1+x¯)
t¯
+ x¯
t¯(x¯+1)
> 0, b = x¯
2
t¯(x¯+1)
> 0, c = ln(1+x¯)
t¯2
> 0. From that,
1
µ
ln
(
1 +
(<{hHk,k,nxIk,n})2 − k,k,n‖xIk,n‖2
ϕk,n(xI)
)
≥ a(`) − b(`) ϕk,n(x
I)(<{hHk,k,nxIk,n})2 − k,k,n‖xIk,n‖2 − c(`)µ
(A.3)
where a(`), b(`), c(`), and d(`) are defined in (32). Now, using (<{hHk,k,nxIk,n})2 ≥ ψk,n(xIk,n) with ψk,n(xIk,n) ≥
0 defined in (33), together with (A.3) leads to
1
µ
ln
(
1 +
(<{hHk,k,nxIk,n})2 − k,k,n‖xIk,n‖2
ϕk,n(xI)
)
≥ a(`) − b(`) ϕk,n(x
I)
νk,n(xIk,n)
− c(`)µ
, f¯ 1,(`)k,n (xI , µ) (A.4)
for 0 ≤ νk,n(xIk,n) ≤ ψk,n(xIk,n) − 0||xIk,n||2, ∀k ∈ K, n ∈ Nk. The function f¯ 1,(`)k,n (xI , µ) is concave on
(31).
Next, (34) follows from the following inequality
ln(1 + t) ≤ ln(1 + t′) + (t− t′)/(1 + t′) ∀t ≥ 0, t′ ≥ 0,
which is a consequence of the concavity of function ln(1 + t).
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Now, it remains to prove (21). By substituting q¯k,n(x, µ), defined in (21), into the constraint (36), we
have:√
βk,n
µ− 1 +
1
µ− 1
 ∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
k,k‖xIk,n¯‖2 +
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
k¯,k‖xIk¯,n¯‖2
+∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k
k¯,k‖xEk¯,n¯‖2 ≤
∑
k¯∈K
∑
n¯∈N1,k
‖HHk¯,kxEk¯,n¯‖2 +
1
µ− 1
 ∑
n¯∈Nk\{n}
‖HHk,kxIk,n¯‖2 +
∑
k¯∈K\{k}
∑
n¯∈Nk¯
‖HHk¯,kxIk¯,n¯‖2

+(1 +
1
µ− 1)Nevσ
2
a, (A.5)
where right hand side of (A.5) is convex which can be linearized for inner approximation by using [49]
‖x‖2
y
≥ 2<
{
(x(`))Hx
}
y(`)
− ‖x
(`)‖2y
(y(`))
2 , ∀x ∈ CN ,x(`) ∈ CN , y > 0, y(`) > 0, (A.6)
,
‖x‖2 ≥ 2<{(x(`))Hx}− ‖x(`)‖2, ∀x ∈ CN ,x(`) ∈ CN (A.7)
and
1
µ− 1 ≥
2
µ(`) − 1 −
µ− 1
(µ(`) − 1)2 . (A.8)
The first term in the left hand side of (A.5) is nonconvex, which is convexified by using the fact that
√
xy
is concave in x and y, i.e.,
√
xy ≤
√
s(`)y
2
√
y(`)
+
√
y(`)x
2
√
s(`)
. Thus,
√
βk,n
µ−1 is approximated as√
βk,n
µ− 1 ≤
1
2
 βk,n√
β
(`)
k,n(µ
(`) − 1)
+
√
β
(`)
k,n(µ
(`) − 1)
(µ− 1)2
 (A.9)
Thus, using (A.6), (A.7), (A.8), and (A.9) in (A.5), we can get the approximation (37).
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